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  Because of high commodity prices, beginning in 2006, subsidies to farmers in the United 
States, the European Union, and Canada have been reduced significantly. However, signifi-
cant losses have been experienced by the red meat sector, along with escalating food prices. 
Because of rising input costs, the “farm boom” may not be as great as first thought. Ethanol 
made from corn and country-of-origin labeling cloud the U.S. policy scene. Higher commod-
ity prices have caused some countries to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers, resulting in freer 
commodity trade worldwide. Policymakers should attempt to make these trade-barrier cuts 
permanent and should rethink current policy legislation to deal with the possibility of a col-
lapse of world commodity markets. Agricultural commodity prices have dropped significantly 
since early 2008. 
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For many years, farmers worldwide, including in 
the United States, the European Union, and Can-
ada, received large direct and indirect farm subsi-
dies. This picture changed dramatically beginning 
in 2006. Prices for oil, grains, oilseeds, and pulses 
more than doubled. This paper discusses escalat-
ing commodity prices in the context of U.S., 
European Union, and Canadian agricultural pro-
grams and policies. These programs are likely to 
have little effect on world agriculture unless there 
is a significant drop in commodity prices. These 
policies should be redesigned to account for the 
possibility that prices could once again “hit the 
tank.” Higher commodity prices translate into 
higher food prices worldwide. This, in turn, has 
motivated importers to lower tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. Some argue that high food prices have 
brought about a freer trade environment than 
would be possible under trade negotiations alone. 
 
U.S. Farm Legislation 
 
Agricultural commodity and conservation legisla-
tion in the United States has roots in the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1933. Between 1929 and 
1932, net cash farm income fell from US$5.2 
billion to US$1.4 billion. With the introduction of 
new stabilization policies, the magnitude of gov-
ernment transfers to U.S. agricultural producers 
increased from zero dollars in 1933 to US$28 bil-
lion in 2000. As a result, U.S. farm income in-
creased from approximately US$1.4 billion in 
1932 to approximately US$56 billion in 2000. 
  The first U.S. farm bill was passed by Congress 
in 1933. Until 1970, U.S. farm bills dealt mainly 
with issues such as rural poverty, soil conserva-
tion, crop insurance, and farm credit. The 1970 
U.S. Farm Bill introduced direct commodity price 
supports for the first time. Farm bills from 1970 
to 1996 introduced a number of measures such as 
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), pay-
ment-in-kind (PIK), and the Export Enhancement 
Program (EEP). The reform act of 1996 intro-
duced dramatic changes such as removing restric-
tions on acreage set-asides and replacing the tar-
get price and deficiency mechanisms with seven 
annual market transition payments. 
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  There were large farm product surpluses be-
tween 1970 and 1996. Commodities such as milk 
and tree fruits had different programs aimed at 
raising producer incomes and prices. Marketing 
orders allowed for price discrimination between 
markets by setting limits on the quantity sold to 
the high-value market. These orders allowed pro-
ducers to receive blended prices, which were 
higher than the competitive price level. They also 
allowed producers to control quality by specify-
ing minimum grades and sizes. In addition, check-
offs were available for research and development 
and for advertising. 
  Key elements of the 2008 U.S. farm program, 
like the 2003 program, are the loan rate and target 
price provisions for grains, upland cotton, and 
oilseeds. The loan rate for corn remained un-
changed, as did the target price. This was also 
true for rice. For soybeans, the loan rates re-
mained unchanged, but the target price was in-
creased by U.S. 20 cents per bushel. For cotton, 
both the loan rate and target price essentially re-
mained unchanged. For wheat, both the loan rate 
and the target price were increased, with the latter 
increasing from US$3.92 per bushel to US$4.17 
per bushel (Table 1). Overall, support prices in 
nominal terms changed very little. However, in 
view of the sharp rise in input cost beginning in 
2006, real support prices (i.e., loan rate and target 
price) were significantly reduced. 
  Figures 1 through 5 put the loan rates and tar-
get prices from above in the context of actual 
prices. Except for cotton, market prices through 
mid-2008 are significantly above target prices. As 
a result, there has been a significant reduction in 
U.S. farm payments since neither the loan rate nor 




A major reason why rising commodity prices 
have affected food prices as much as they have is 
because rising commodity prices remove the need 
for government payments. Historically, in the 
United States, the latter have kept food prices 
lower than they otherwise would have been. Con-
sider the basic framework of Figure 6, where the 
production quantity q* is established where a given 
support price (Ps) intersects the water-subsidized 
supply curve (S′) at point o instead of at point i, 
where it would otherwise be if only a price 
support subsidy were in effect. The addition of 
the water subsidy to the price support subsidy 
must necessarily increase q0 to q*, given that both 
types of subsidies are binding simultaneously. In 
addition to the increased output, there is a de-
crease in the resulting price necessary to clear the 
world cotton market, P w. For example, under a 
price support subsidy alone, the market-clearing 
equilibrium shifts from point e (i.e., no subsidies) 
to point h; while for a water subsidy alone, the 
shift is from point e to point k. However, with 
both subsidies in place, the market-equilibrating 
shift is from point e to point b. 
  Under the multiplicative effects (ME) scenario 
illustrated in Figure 6, the intersection of the sup-
port price (Ps) and the subsidized supply curve 
(S′) establishes both the output quantity q* (at 
point o) and the world price Pw (at point b). Do-
mestic producers receive the area PsonmePf as a 
net gain, while domestic consumers gain the area 
PfdcPw. The area cdeb (slippage) represents the 
rents received by importing countries. The cost to 
the government for the water subsidy is area 
amno, while the cost of the government price sup-
port payments equals area PsobPw. Therefore the 
combined net domestic cost to society of the two 
subsidies applied together is the shaded area 
aedcb. The net cost comparison is made with ref-
erence to point e, where Pf and q2 are free from 
distortions caused by U.S. cotton subsidies. 
  A key element that determines the size of the 
welfare cost of cotton is the extent to which do-
mestic production is exported. The greater the ex-
ports are, the greater the cost is. Large exports are 
one of the reasons for the inefficiency cost associ-
ated with cotton (Powell and Schmitz 2005). Table 
2 shows that roughly 70 percent of the cotton pro-
duced in the United States is exported. Of the ma-
jor commodities, corn is at the bottom, at less 
than 20 percent of total production. 
  In the context of Figure 6, note that producer 
prices under a target price specification exceed 
the equivalent consumer prices. It is this gap that 
has given rise to large government payments. 
This model was used to estimate the impact of 
U.S. cotton policy for 2002 and 2003. Rossi, 
Schmitz, and Schmitz (2007) find that the U.S. 
cotton program depressed world prices some-
where between 10 percent and 20 percent, de-
pending on whether producers made production 
decisions at the loan rate or target prices. 
  Figures 1 through 5 show how the world has 
changed and why the welfare costs of U.S. grains, 20   April 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 1. U.S. Loan Rates and Target Prices, Selected Crops (2002 and 2008) 
2002  2008   
Commodity  Loan Rate  Target Price  Loan Rate  Target Price 
 ( U.S. dollars)  (U.S. dollars) 
Corn ($/bushel)  $1.95  $2.63  $1.95  $2.63 
Rice ($/hundredweight)  $6.50  $10.50  $6.50  $10.50 
Soybeans ($/bushel)  $5.00  $5.80  $5.00  $6.00 
Upland cotton ($/pound)  $0.52  $0.72  $0.52  $0.71 
Wheat ($/bushel)  $2.75  $3.92  $2.94  $4.17 




Figure 1. Corn: Loan Rate and Target Prices 
 
oilseeds, and cotton are small indeed. Producer 
prices have risen above the target prices, but ac-
companying these has been an increase in con-
sumer prices. In Figure 1, for a market price 
above the support price, consumers pay an equiva-
lent price. There is no longer a wedge between 
producer and consumer prices. High consumer 
prices now pay farmers’ variable costs, where 
before part of this was covered by government 
payments. 
 
COOL: Producers and Consumers 
 
A controversial element of the U.S. Farm Bill is 
the country-of-origin labeling (COOL) require-




Figure 2. Cotton: Loan Rate and Target Prices 
 
also falls under COOL. Unfortunately, there has 
been little theoretical discussion of COOL effects, 
nor has there been a great deal of empirical analy-
sis on the subject. COOL can cause food prices to 
increase even further. Consider Figure 7, where 
there are two countries—say, Canada and the 
United States. The excess supply curve of Cana-
dian beef is given by Es. The supply curve of U.S. 
beef is Su. The total demand by U.S. consumers 
for all beef produced in both Canada and the 
United States is given by Du, where D is the de-
mand by U.S. consumers for beef produced in the 
United States. Under free trade, Canada exports 
beef to the United States at price Pf . At this point, 
beef from Canada is a perfect substitute for U.S.- 
produced beef. 
 The  COOL requirements are not new. For 
example, Florida initiated a COOL statute in 1979 
for fruits, vegetables, and honey, and added aqua-
culture products in 1996. COOL labeling is 
checked during routine store sanitation inspec-
tions. The costs and benefits from labeling have 
never been empirically determined, but transac-
tion costs due to COOL are likely one important 
cost component in the food chain. On many prod-
ucts, one sees labels such as “made in Canada” or 
“made in the United States” under no COOL laws. 
The companies that use such labels obviously 
believe that there is a positive rate of return from 
this type of investment, and the market dictates a 
return. Why then is there a need for compulsory 
COOL? 
 Suppose  COOL creates a consumer perception 
of U.S. beef as being of superior quality to Cana-
dian beef, and hence a willingness to pay a higher 
price for U.S. beef relative to Canadian beef. This 
has the effect of shifting the U.S. demand for 
U.S.-produced beef to Dc. Now the demand for 
Canadian beef shifts from Df to Df′. In equilib-
rium, the U.S. price rises from pf to p1. U.S. pro-
ducers gain from COOL by pfp1ef. In terms of 
Canadian beef, price falls to p2 given consump-
tion of q3. There is a net loss for Canada of 
p2abpf. Note that COOL acts as a non-tariff bar-
rier, as it creates a price wedge between U.S. and 
Canadian producers of (p1 – p2). 
  What happens if U.S. consumers, because of 
COOL, viewed Canadian beef as superior to U.S. 
beef? Consider where U.S. demand for U.S.-pro-




Figure 3. Rice: Loan Rate and Target Prices 
 
 
shifting the Canadian demand to D0, raising the 
price of Canadian beef to p4, and lowering the 
price of U.S.-produced beef to p3. U.S. producers 
now lose p3qfpf from COOL, while Canada gains 
pfbhp4. COOL still acts as a non-tariff barrier, but 
now the price for Canadian beef exceeds the U.S. 
price. 
  In the above discussion, we assume that COOL 
creates a “product differential effect.” If it does 
not, then COOL merely adds to the costs of pro-
ducing and selling beef through added transaction 
costs from labeling. Regardless, transaction costs 
under COOL essentially shift the aggregate supply 
of beef upwards. 
  In the above discussion, it is clear how beef 
producers in Canada and the United States are 
affected by COOL. The effect on consumer wel-
fare is much more difficult to determine than on 
producer welfare. Consider Figure 8, in which Pf 
is the free trade price and beef is viewed as a per-
fectly substitutable commodity. U.S. beef produc-
tion is qf. Now suppose that because of COOL, 
U.S. beef demand shifts to Dc. If this were true, 
consumer welfare in the United States would fall. 
This is because of the loss in aggregate U.S. sur-
plus of abPf > (p2gh + p1dj). However, what if 
demand shifts to Dc′ instead of Dc? That is, for a 
given price and quantity, the shifted demand curve 
becomes more price-inelastic. In this case, con-
sumers (as measured by consumer surplus) in the 
United States are made better off by COOL (this 
would have to be the case, or they would not 
view U.S. beef as superior to Canadian beef). 
 
Ethanol and Market Distortions 
 
The most charged and controversial subject is the 
production of ethanol from U.S. corn production. 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (2008) fore-
casts that, by 2010, roughly 4.5 billion bushels of 
the corn grown in the United States, roughly one-
third of the U.S. crop, will be used for ethanol 
production. There is tariff protection on the im-
portation of ethanol production from abroad, 




Figure 4. Soybeans: Loan Rate and Target Prices 
 
 
ethanol production and interact with U.S. coun-
tercyclical and loan deficiency payments. 
  There are likely as many supporters of ethanol 
as there are those opposed to ethanol production 
from corn. One often hears negative statements 
about the impact of ethanol production. For ex-
ample, Michael Grunwald discusses “The Clean 
Energy Scam” in Time magazine (Grunwald 2008). 
According to Grunwald, “politicians and big busi-
ness are pushing biofuels like corn-based ethanol 
as alternatives to oil. All they’re really doing is 
driving up food prices and making global warm-
ing worse—and you’re paying for it” (Time cover 
page). Also, high corn prices have large negative 
impacts on the livestock sector (Figure 9). 
  Schmitz, Moss, and Schmitz (2007) and Gard-
ner (2007) use a welfare economics framework to 
examine the impact of ethanol production from 
corn in the context of U.S. agricultural policy. 
They find that ethanol boosts corn prices some-
where between US$0.75 and US$1.25 per bushel, 
thus eliminating the need for U.S. countercyclical 
and loan deficiency payments. They further find 
that the demand for corn for ethanol production 
could be positive without a tax credit. At least 
two factors affect ethanol production, namely a 
favorable oil-to-corn price ratio and a tax credit 
for ethanol production. 
  Generally, the authors find that while there are 
gainers and losers from ethanol production, on 
net there can be significant welfare costs, but 
these costs can be small or even negative if etha-
nol has a significant impact on the price of gaso-
line from fossil fuels. The findings hinge as well 
on several other key parameters. A key compo-
nent is the impact of ethanol on commodity pay-
ments. The rise in corn prices due to ethanol has 
wiped out the need for commodity payments. It is 
important to identify net benefits and costs from 
both a world and U.S. perspective, where little 
weight may be given to foreign impacts such as 
losses to corn importers. While ethanol certainly 
benefited U.S. corn farmers, it had a negative 
impact on livestock producers. On this there is 
general agreement. An interesting study by Farm-
Econ LLC for the Coalition for Balanced Food & 
Fuel, a group representing U.S. livestock, poultry, 




Figure 5. Wheat: Loan Rate and Target Prices 
 
 
finds that the costs for 2008–2009 for biofuel 
support exceed US$1 billion for Iowa, North Caro-
lina, and Texas (Elam 2008). There are at least 
ten states with costs ranging between US$500 mil-
lion and US$1 billion. 
  There is little agreement on the impact of corn 
prices from ethanol production. At the high end, 
FarmEcon LLC estimated the price impact at 
roughly US$1.30/bushel. Gardner (2007) and 
Schmitz, Moss, and Schmitz (2007) put the price 
at below US$1.00/bushel. In this regard, caution 
should be used when interpreting the impact of 
the ethanol tax credit along with the ethanol tariff 
on the use of corn for ethanol. A model is badly 
needed that estimates the impact of these on corn 
demand. As we point out, given high oil prices, 
ethanol may well have emerged even without tax 
credits. Then there is the nagging issue of the 
impact of ethanol on food prices. FarmEcon LLC 
estimates that the price impact is significant, 
while the Agricultural and Food Policy Center at 
Texas A&M University argues that ethanol has a 
minor effect on food costs (Anderson et al. 2008). 
The Texas A&M study argues that corn and oil 
play a small role in higher food prices, and that 
tight global supplies are more to blame. In 
addition, they find that the livestock industry is 
struggling with passing on costs. Regardless of 
the goodness or badness of ethanol production, it 
is being fueled by many factors, including man-
dated ethanol blends in fuel. In a study cospon-
sored by the U.S. Department of Energy and the 
American Coalition for Ethanol, from a fuel effi-
ciency standpoint the optimal blend of ethanol is 
greater than 10 percent, and a mandate greater 
than this level would likely absorb an even larger 
share of the corn crop and increase competition 
for livestock producers. 
 
Canadian Agricultural Programs 
 
Contrary to public perception, there were very 
few government transfers to Canadian farmers 




Figure 6. Multiplicative Effects of Water Subsidy and Price Supports 
Source: Rossi, Schmitz, and Schmitz (2005). 
 
2002, Fulton, Rosaasen, and Schmitz 1989). Be-
tween 1949 and 1997, transfer payments peaked 
in the mid-1980s at over Can$2.5 billion. After 
this period, payments once again increased. The 
numerous programs that have been put in place in 
Canada are documented in Schmitz (2008). The 
Supply Management Program covers broilers and 
dairy. The other commodities are covered by the 
Crop Insurance and Canadian Agricultural In-
come Stabilization (CAIS) Programs. 
  Farm income on the prairies has been negative 
for quite some time. For example, in Saskatche-
wan, between 1983 and 2007, farmers reported 
positive incomes only in 1996 (Figure 10). How-
ever, correspondingly, farm payments were posi-
tive for the negative-income years. At times, 
these annual farm payments exceeded Can$1 
billion. 
Survival of the Livestock Sector and the Crow’s 
Nest Freight Rate (CROW) 
 
A great deal of the discussion over high com-
modity prices ignores the red meat sector. This 
sector, which includes beef and pork, has taken a 
great hit because feed costs have risen signifi-
cantly. This is true worldwide. 
  In the Canadian context, even with payouts 
under the CAIS program, the hog and beef cattle 
industries experienced heavy losses in 2007. For 
example, in the beginning of 2008, more than 
one-half of the hog establishments in Saskatche-
wan ceased operation. This was in part due to 
rapidly rising grain prices in 2007, which contin-
ued into 2008. One might question why, in the 
presence of the CAIS program, actual farm losses 
from livestock production were so large. Because 26   April 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 2. Selected U.S. Commodities and the Importance of Trade (2002–2005) 
Commodity  % of World Production  % of World Trade  % of Production Exported 
Cotton 20%  40%  70% 
Corn 40%  60%  18% 
Rice 2%  13%  52% 
Soybeans 38%  44%  35% 
Wheat 9%  25%  50% 

























Figure 7. COOL Effects 
 
of the seriousness of the problem, on February 
25, 2008, Canada offered $3.3 billion in support 
programs for hog and cattle producers facing 
tough economic conditions. Repayable advances 
of up to Can$400,000 per farmer were made to 
establish a new sow cull program. 
 
Coalitions For and Against the CROW Change 
 
It is interesting to recall the debate over elimi-
nating the CROW transportation subsidy. At the 
time of the intense debate in the early 1990s, 
many argued that its elimination would spur in-
creased livestock production through falling grain 
prices. Ironically, due to many factors, the strong 
belief that livestock would be the savior of prairie 
agriculture has weakened considerably. To make 
matters worse, the actual payment that producers 
received as CROW payouts was far less than 
suggested by economic analysis (Schmitz, High-
moor, and Schmitz 2002). The CROW payout in 




















Figure 8. COOL and Consumer Perception 
 
 
1996, the yearly government payments to the rail-
ways averaged Can$704.9 million from 1985 to 
1995. Schmitz, Highmoor, and Schmitz (2002) 
calculate that full compensation would have been 
about Can$8.5 billion. This is in sharp contrast to 
the U.S. peanut and tobacco programs, where the 
buyout to eliminate these programs was greater 
than suggested by economic modeling (Schmitz, 
Schmitz, and Rossi 2006). 
 
EU Agricultural Policy 
 
When the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
was set up in the early 1960s, the European Un-
ion (EU) was a net cereal grains importer. Over 
time, because of technological change and other 
factors, the European Union became a net grain 
exporter. Carter and Schmitz (1979) argued that, 
at least prior to 1980, the European Union im-
posed the optimal welfare tariff on cereal imports. 
Later, the European Union, as it switched from 
net importer to exporter, provided for export sub-
sidies. Over time, because of technology and 
other factors, the European Union became a net 
cereal exporter. 
  There have been many changes to CAP over 
the years; they are discussed in detail in Swin-
bank (2008). The most recent reform is the single 
farm payment scheme (SFP) initiated in 2003, 
under which producers are guaranteed compen-
satory payments through at least 2013. In addi-
tion, the European Union still maintains price 
supports that are well below market prices. Single 
farm payments were designed to further the de-
gree of agricultural decoupling in the European 
Union. However, even though the EU policy is 
more decoupled, EU producers appear to be 
“laughing all the way to the bank” because of the 
double payments: one from the government and 
the other from the marketplace. 
 
High Food Prices and the Fall in Tariff and 
Non-Tariff Barriers 
 
High commodity prices have caused a significant 





Figure 9. Ethanol and Livestock 
Source: Muirhead (2008). 
 
 
There has been a dramatic increase in the import 
bill of major food commodities, except sugar, 
where expenditures have actually decreased. 
  High food prices have resulted in lower tariff 
and non-tariff barriers. The following points, 
quoted from Benjamin and Drajem (2008), are of 
interest: 
 
 The surge in world food prices is accomplishing what 
seven years of trade talks haven’t: knocking down im-
port barriers. 
 The Doha round of global trade negotiations has been 
stalled since 2001 because developing nations have 
refused to lower import tariffs that protect their farm-
ers and rich countries won’t give up farm-price sup-
ports. Now, import duties are being slashed [globally] 
in response to prices that the World Bank says have 
risen 83 percent the past three years; subsidies in the 
U.S. and Europe are falling. 
 Since early 2007...developing nations have taken a raft 
of measures to increase imports. 
 India removed a 36 percent import tariff on wheat 
flour, and Indonesia eliminated duties on wheat and 
soybeans. Peru jettisoned tariffs on wheat and corn. 
Turkey cut import taxes on wheat to 8 percent from 
130 percent and on barley to zero from 100 percent. 
Mongolia scrapped its value-added tax on imported 
wheat and flour. 
 [The World Bank states that] at least 24 nations have 
reduced duties and value-added taxes.... 
 In the U.S., farm subsidies are expected to fall below 
$8 billion [in 2008], down from $13 billion in 2005. 
 The prospect that food prices will remain relatively 
high in the future helps the U.S. accept lower levels of 
subsidies. 
 High food prices.... [have] obvious benefits in terms 
of subsidy payments and import tariffs. 
 After years of protecting domestic production of food 
staples by penalizing imports, places like Indonesia 
and the Philippines...are suddenly welcoming Ameri-
can rice. 
 In the U.S. and EU, subsidies are [being reduced] be-
cause farm supports are based on world prices. U.S. 
food prices have increased 6.5 percent [in 2008]. 
 
  However, on the export side, there are some 
offsets toward freer trade. Export duties and taxes 





Figure 10. Saskatchewan: Farm Payments and Profits (1971–2007, selected years) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
35 percent duty on wheat exports and Russia 
quadrupled wheat export taxes to 40 percent. 
  Details of selected country policy responses to 
high commodity prices are given in Table 4. For 
example, Ecuador, India, and Boliva have elimi-
nated tariffs on wheat and wheat flour. On the 
other hand, China has introduced export quotas 
on flour made of wheat, maize, and rice. This has 
also been the case for the exportation of Indo-
nesian rice. 
 
High Input Prices and Falling Commodity 
Prices 
 
The news media focuses on high commodity 
prices and the corresponding price increase for 
food. Little attention is paid to the corresponding 
rising input prices. Consider the very simplistic 
model in Figure 11. For a given price support of 
ps, output is q. The consumer price that clears the 
market is pc and government deficiency payments 
total pspcba. 
  Now suppose that the demand curve shifts to 
D′, but that there is no change in input prices. The 
price increases to p′s , deficiency payments disap-
pear, and producers gain psaa′p′s. But what hap-
pens if input costs also rise along with commodity 
prices? For a new supply curve S′, which reflects 
rising input prices, the price increases to p. New 
producers gain only by an amount pef – psag. 
  A detailed study is not available on the degree 
to which rising input costs in 2007 and 2008 af-
fect farm production costs (e.g., fertilizer prices 
have more than doubled since 1970; see Table 5). 
We argue that variable costs for grains, oilseeds, 
and pulse crops have increased by at least 20 
percent. 
  In the context of Figure 11, it is interesting to 
explore what happens if input costs remain high 
and commodity prices fall. From the U.S. per- 30   April 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 3. Forecast Import Bills of Total Food and Major Food Commodities (2006 and 2007) 
 World  Countries  Developing Countries  LD Countries
a  LIFD Countries
b 
  2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 
 ( US$ million)  (US$ million)  (US$ million)  (US$ million) 
Total  food  614,887 744,777 185,529 232,814  13,362  15,937  86,473 107,236 
Cereals  174,399  240,784  69,410  93,603 5,683 7,185  29,450  38,258 
Vegetable  oils  70,956 96,100 35,050 47,236  1,945  2,659 22,884 32,107 
Dairy  43,666 71,916 12,930 21,278  801  1,302  4,924  8,115 
Meat  77,865 82,447 16,806 19,034  810  915  6,013  7,317 
Sugar  32,975 21,755 13,871 11,263  1,753  1,249  7,587  4,525 
a LD countries = least developed countries. 
b LIFD countries = low-income food deficit countries. 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (2008). 
 
spective, a fall in price to below the target price 
would trigger government payments, but such a 
price drop would have disastrous consequences as 
the target prices in the 2008 U.S. Farm Bill are in 
nominal terms and hence do not reflect inflation 
and rising input costs. For the European Union, 
compensatory payments along with government 
assistance cushion the fall in prices. In Canada, 
the CAIS program provides payments to produc-
ers based on an individual producer’s historical 
income. If income falls below a threshold level 
based on past incomes, a government payout is 
triggered. Consider this program in the context of 
rapidly rising grain and oilseed prices. Suppose 
that these high prices continue for three years and 
then collapse. Along with the collapse would be a 
fall in farmers’ income. This would trigger sig-
nificant payouts under CAIS but would reduce 
government exposure under crop insurance as 
coverage is price-dependent. Interestingly, Cana-
dian farmers could receive significant payments 
under CAIS, while their U.S. counterparts could 
receive little or no government payments, as fal-
ling prices may still be above the U.S. target 




In 2008, the United States implemented a new 
farm program. It contains many of the same ele-
ments as the previous farm bill. However, monies 
were added for the fruit and vegetable sectors. In 
terms of support levels for the basic commodities, 
including corn, wheat, rice, and cotton, support 
levels did not increase appreciably. In real terms, 
price supports have fallen dramatically. In view 
of world market prices, the only major export 
commodity where price supports are binding is 
cotton since prices are still below target levels. It 
appears that the new U.S. farm program did not 
make progress towards decoupling since the old 
mechanism design for income support remains 
and the buyouts that did occur for peanuts and 
cotton were prior to the 2008 U.S. Farm Bill. The 
net cost of U.S. farm policy is small for grains 
and oilseeds but much larger for cotton and sugar 
(Gardner 2002, Schmitz, Furtan, and Baylis 2002, 
Sumner 2007). 
  The European Union is moving more and more 
towards a decoupled program since it introduced 
the single farm payment scheme in 2003. Cor-
respondingly, farmers will be paid yearly com-
pensatory payments until at least 2015. This ap-
proach has reduced the welfare costs of the CAP. 
However, EU farmers not only receive these 
payments, but also additional market rents from 
high commodity prices. In a sense, the EU 
farmers are being paid twice: once from the gov-
ernment and again from the market. If the single 
payment scheme had not been introduced, farm-
ers would have benefited from rising prices 
through market payments, but government pay-
ments would have been drastically reduced (i.e., 
compensatory payments would not have been 
made—a situation similar to the United States). 
  With the sharp rise in commodity prices, sev-
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Figure 11. Rising Commodity Prices and Input Costs 
 
 
to the European Union, what level of support re-
mains since the support levels upon which com-
pensatory payments were made are no longer 
binding. If prices fall to old levels, the threshold 
prices will once again become binding. Second, 
given high commodity prices, the welfare costs of 
the U.S. and EU policies have been greatly re-
duced. In addition, the treasury outlays have been 
greatly reduced. For example, in the United States 
in 2008, except for direct payments, cotton will 
be the only major commodity receiving govern-
ment payments. (As of November 1, 2008, the 
price of U.S. cotton was roughly 30 cents per 
pound below the target price.) 
  Some contend that high commodity prices are 
now moving the world toward freer trade—
something that trade negotiations have not been 
able to do. However, freer trade brought about by 
higher commodity prices has much different wel-
fare implications than freer trade brought about 
by the removal of distortions caused by farm sub-
sidies. In standard analysis, the prices of com-
modities under price support systems fall for ex-
porters in the move toward freer trade. However, 
in today’s reality, this may no longer be the case, 
because commodity prices in exporting countries 
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  (in dollars per short ton) 
1970 75  54  83  60  75  94  51 
1975 265  153  244  186  214  263  102 
1980 229  134  221  165  247  297  135 
1985 255  143  221  192  206  244  126 
1990 199  132  184  180  201  219  155 
1995 330  169  266  223  234  263  155 
1996 303  182  278  233  258  294  153 
1997 303  160  257  227  257  272  152 
1998 253  134  195  193  253  264  163 
1999 211  128  176  181  255  264  168 
2000 227  131  200  194  233  240  165 
2001 399  189  280  260  236  244  170 
2002 250  127  191  195  221  227  164 
2003 373  161  261  243  243  250  165 
2004 379  178  276  263  266  276  181 
2005 416  215  332  292  299  303  245 
2006 521  232  362  366  324  337  273 
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